Microsoft has begun implementation of its Next-Generation Secure Computing Base with the introduction of Secure Startup – Full-Volume Encryption in Windows Vista, though other components of the plan are too late to be included.

At this year’s Windows Hardware Engineering Conference, Microsoft announced that the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base was late, and most of the technology would not make it into Windows Longhorn, now known as Windows Vista. However, support for Secure Startup – Full-Volume Encryption will be included. Secure Startup ostensibly allows a Windows Vista computer to determine if its hardware environment has been tampered with, and refuse to boot if so, and also to encrypt the entire hard drive transparently to the user.

It’s rather interesting how this is supposed to work.

The feature uses a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 1.2 in order to protect the hardware itself and to store the encryption key for the hard drive. Seth Schoen explains the implications:

When a laptop protected with this technology is lost or stolen, its hard drive cannot usefully be decrypted if removed from the laptop; if the laptop is booted normally, however, its operating system will continue to enforce its security policy, denying access to anyone who does not present the appropriate passwords or credentials. This technique can also protect data on a machine in a colocation facility by denying access to anyone who steals or seizes the colocated machine. In a sense, TPM-based hard drive encryption means that obtaining physical access to a machine will no longer allow someone to obtain administrator-privileged access to the data stored on that machine. It does not, however, inherently impose any new restrictions on those with authorized access.

Still, Microsoft notes that a skilled person can attack the TPM from hardware. Thus, someone who steals a laptop might be able to use the PC equivalent of a video game console mod chip to bypass the TPM protections and recover data. The hardware necessary for this attack is inexpensive, but the skill and time required are fairly great. It may therefore be the case that TPM-based file or disk encryption will provide adequate protection for laptops against opportunistic or non-targeted attack. As even the Trusted Computing Group acknowledges, the TPM is not intended to protect against a skilled hardware attacker. If hardware attacks against the TPM become cheap and readily available, the kind of protection TPM-based trusted computing offers to a stolen laptop — or a colocated machine with sensitive data — may appear increasingly inadequate. In Microsoft’s view, it is still likely strong enough to deter casual thieves from getting at sensitive information, because they are not likely to try to make sophisticated attempts to break a stolen system’s security policy. On the other hand, law enforcement agents or corporate spies might well develop automated means of defeating this kind of security. — Electronic Frontier Foundation

The long and short of it is this: Secure Startup – Full Volume Encryption will only protect your personal or corporate data against a casual attacker. Anyone determined to get at the data, such as a large corporation or a government, is going to get it anyway. This is mainly useful only in the circumstance that an employee’s laptop gets stolen; it won’t protect you against corporate espionage.

In addition, for those of you playing at home, the TPM as specified and implemented will ultimately place control of your computer in the hands of Microsoft. As the development of the Next Generation Secure Computing Base progresses, look for Windows technologies such as the Protected Media Path — which will be in Windows Vista — to prevent you from using your computer in completely legal ways.

In the near future, when you try to install software to time-shift your favorite Real Audio webcast, your PC might disable all media player applications. Until you remove the software, your PC will remain crippled. Or perhaps you want to watch a downloaded movie on a wide-screen TV, but your PC might turn off its video card’s analog output.

Welcome to the world of Windows Longhorn (now known as Vista) and the Protected Media Path, where Microsoft, copyright holders, and DRM licensors may grant or revoke permission to use your own computer and digital media. — Electronic Frontier Foundation

And why is Microsoft doing this? Because they’re the platform provider. (Warning: Microsoft’s statement on content protection is surprisingly content-free.)

Next-generation DVDs will apparently use a new encryption scheme called AACS (Advanced Access Content System). Like its predecessor CSS (Content Scrambling System) it is completely useless at preventing copying. Instead, it prevents playback of your original DVD on unapproved players. In order to build a DVD player, one must pay quite large licensing fees for CSS to include it in the DVD player.

In case you missed that very important point there, here it is again. CSS does not prevent copying DVDs. Anyone can make an exact copy a DVD, without ever decrypting it, and throw the copy in their DVD player, and it will play perfectly. In fact, this strategy is typically used by large-scale pirates. What CSS really does is primarily to enforce the DVD region-coding scheme and force manufacturers to pay to build DVD players. There is no reason at present to believe AACS will be any different.

And if you think you can escape, and actually play your DVDs the way you want to by switching to Linux, think again. Intel is planning to close that loophole with its East Fork project.

So, Linux becomes a forbidden for those who want to watch a movie legally. Think this is by chance? Think it won’t catch on? There is a $300 million plus ad campaign cooking to make sure you equate digital media with [East Fork], and don’t question that you are giving up all your rights to pay for the privilege. People are stupid, and by the time they catch on that the EF machine they bought is the main method that they are being screwed by, it will be too late and you won’t be able to buy anything else. — The Inquirer

If you want to maintain control over your own computer, you would be well advised to follow the trusted computing and Microsoft Next Generation Secure Computing Base initiatives closely. They currently represent the largest threat to computing as we know it by eliminating the ability for you to trust your computer. Not to mention all the money the movie studios stand to make from it.