Why did the 9/11 commission ignore Able Danger?

November 19, 2005 @ Michael Hampton → 5 Comments

An article from former FBI director Louis Freeh which appeared in Thursday’s Wall Street Journal raises the question of why did the 9/11 Commission ignore Able Danger?

In case you’ve been avoiding news, Able Danger was a military intelligence operation which, its members claim, identified several of the 9/11 hijackers more than a year in advance of the attacks.

Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named “Able Danger” have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently, military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even though appointments had been made to do so. Why?

There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?

The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it “was not historically significant.” This astounding conclusion — in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings — raises serious challenges to the commission’s credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself. — Louis Freeh

Read the whole thing.

It may be a while before all the facts are in on this, but it looks pretty, er, explosive right now.

Freeh resigned as FBI director a few months before the September 11, 2001 attacks. He is now senior vice chairman and general counsel for MBNA.

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5 Comments → “Why did the 9/11 commission ignore Able Danger?”

Jason

Nov 20, 2005

Question:
If Able Danger is this good, and identified the bad people without stepping outside the boundries…
Why do we need the patriot act?
Michael Hampton

Nov 20, 2005

We don’t need the Patriot Act.

One of the interesting facts that the 9/11 commission report went into in depth was that all of the various federal agencies didn’t know the rules under which they could share information with each other, and many of them were completely unaware that they could share information. As a result, much vital intelligence such as this wasn’t shared.

Consider:

In July 1995, Attorney General Reno issued formal procedures aimed at managing information sharing between Justice Department prosecutors and the FBI. They were developed in a working group led by the Justice Department’s Executive Office of National Security, overseen by Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. These procedures — while requiring the sharing of intelligence information with prosecutors — regulated the manner in which such information could be shared from the intelligence side of the house to the criminal side.

These procedures were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied. As a result, there was far less information sharing and coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division in practice than was allowed under the department’s procedures. Over time the procedures came to be referred to as “the wall.” The term “the wall” is misleading, however, because several factors led to a series of barriers to information sharing that developed.

The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became the sole gatekeeper for passing information to the Criminal Division. Though Attorney General Reno’s procedures did not include such a provision, the Office assumed the role anyway, arguing that its position reflected the concerns of Judge Royce Lamberth, then chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The Office threatened that if it could not regulate the flow of information to criminal prosecutors, it would no longer present the FBI’s warrant requests to the FISA Court. The information flow withered.

The 1995 procedures dealt only with sharing between agents and criminal prosecutors, not between two kinds of FBI agents, those working on intelligence matters and those working on criminal matters. But pressure from the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, FBI leadership, and the FISA Court built barriers between agents — even agents serving on the same squads. FBI Deputy Director Bryant reinforced the Officeâ€™s caution by informing agents that too much information sharing could be a career stopper. Agents in the field began to believe — incorrectly — that no FISA information could be shared with agents working on criminal investigations.

A similar situation existed between the FBI and CIA, the FBI and DoD, etc. In short, bureaucracy caused this intelligence failure, not a lack of law enforcement tools.
Jason

Nov 20, 2005

We donâ€™t need the Patriot Act.

Ding ding ding, we have a winner.
(P.S. That’s all I wanted to hear )
Jacob

Nov 26, 2005

From what I have read from IO ERROR, it seems like the Patriot Act is required or at least the provision that the intelligent agencies can go through each other without the need of a third party.

There has to be a law saying that the Intelligent Agencies can share information or other parties are going to come in and say that it is impossible working off of misinformation and aggroance.

We may never know if Able Danger could have succeed in anything more than disrupting the commission. From what I have heard, the parties that were involved in destroying the evidence or not allowing the information to leave the CIA have created Yet Another Conspiracy Theory(tm) from the jumble of reports and speeches given and from accounts that Able Danger isn’t real.

It could take another 50 years before the truth (if any) comes out and during that time. You will have freaks saying that either it wasn’t real, or that Able Danger could have stopped 9/11. Normal citizens won’t know what to believe if the evidence doesn’t conclude and the facts don’t come out.
Sep 11, 2006

9/11 whistleblowers ignored, retaliated against - Homeland Stupidity

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