There has to be a law saying that the Intelligent Agencies can share information or other parties are going to come in and say that it is impossible working off of misinformation and aggroance.

We may never know if Able Danger could have succeed in anything more than disrupting the commission. From what I have heard, the parties that were involved in destroying the evidence or not allowing the information to leave the CIA have created Yet Another Conspiracy Theory(tm) from the jumble of reports and speeches given and from accounts that Able Danger isn’t real.

It could take another 50 years before the truth (if any) comes out and during that time. You will have freaks saying that either it wasn’t real, or that Able Danger could have stopped 9/11. Normal citizens won’t know what to believe if the evidence doesn’t conclude and the facts don’t come out.

We don’t need the Patriot Act.

Ding ding ding, we have a winner.
(P.S. That’s all I wanted to hear )

One of the interesting facts that the 9/11 commission report went into in depth was that all of the various federal agencies didn’t know the rules under which they could share information with each other, and many of them were completely unaware that they could share information. As a result, much vital intelligence such as this wasn’t shared.

Consider:

In July 1995, Attorney General Reno issued formal procedures aimed at managing information sharing between Justice Department prosecutors and the FBI. They were developed in a working group led by the Justice Department’s Executive Office of National Security, overseen by Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. These procedures — while requiring the sharing of intelligence information with prosecutors — regulated the manner in which such information could be shared from the intelligence side of the house to the criminal side.

These procedures were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied. As a result, there was far less information sharing and coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division in practice than was allowed under the department’s procedures. Over time the procedures came to be referred to as “the wall.” The term “the wall” is misleading, however, because several factors led to a series of barriers to information sharing that developed.

The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became the sole gatekeeper for passing information to the Criminal Division. Though Attorney General Reno’s procedures did not include such a provision, the Office assumed the role anyway, arguing that its position reflected the concerns of Judge Royce Lamberth, then chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The Office threatened that if it could not regulate the flow of information to criminal prosecutors, it would no longer present the FBI’s warrant requests to the FISA Court. The information flow withered.

The 1995 procedures dealt only with sharing between agents and criminal prosecutors, not between two kinds of FBI agents, those working on intelligence matters and those working on criminal matters. But pressure from the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, FBI leadership, and the FISA Court built barriers between agents — even agents serving on the same squads. FBI Deputy Director Bryant reinforced the Office’s caution by informing agents that too much information sharing could be a career stopper. Agents in the field began to believe — incorrectly — that no FISA information could be shared with agents working on criminal investigations.

A similar situation existed between the FBI and CIA, the FBI and DoD, etc. In short, bureaucracy caused this intelligence failure, not a lack of law enforcement tools.