A recently declassified National Security Agency document from early 2001 states that the “worldwide proliferation of strong encryption” and the “explosion of global telecommunications” networks threaten NSA’s core mission of signals intelligence collection.

“Significant effort and investment are being applied to mastering the global network, both to protect our nation’s communications and to exploit those of our targets,” the document says. “This new model for eSIGINT and for information assurance in the Information Age may require a restatement and endorsement of the policies and authorities that empowered NSA in the Industrial Age.”

This is nothing anyone couldn’t have told you back in 2001. In fact, people were saying it back then, and even before then. But the legal authorities under which NSA operates haven’t changed, while the nature of communications has. The report cites the growth of fiber-optic lines and wireless communications as key targets for NSA.

(S) SIGINT in the Industrial Age meant collecting signals, often high frequency (HF) signals connecting two discrete and known target points, processing the often clear text data, and writing a report. eSIGINT in the Information Age means seeking out information on the Global Net, using all available access techniques, breaking often strong encryption, again using all available means, defending our nation’s own use of the Global Net, and assisting our warfighters in preparing the battlefield for the cyberwars of the future. The Fourth Amendment is as applicable to eSIGINT as it is to the SIGINT of yesterday and today. The Information Age will however cause us to rethink and reapply the procedures, policies and authorities born in an earlier electronic surveillance environment.

(U//FOUO) Make no mistake, NSA can and will perform its missions consistent with the Fourth Amendment and all applicable laws. But senior leadership must understand that today’s and tomorrow’s mission will demand a powerful, permanent presence on a global telecommunications network that will host the “protected” communications of Americans as well as the targeted communications of adversaries.

Last month, the New York Times reported on a special surveillance program ordered by President George W. Bush, which targeted the communications to and from the U.S. of people suspected of terrorist links or people suspected of being linked to those people, without getting the warrants required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

NSA reportedly collects digital transmissions from major telecommunications carrier switching stations and uses data-mining techniques to sift through the massive volume of data.

In addition, NSA still doesn’t want strong encryption getting out. It counts as one of its top goals to “counter the worldwide proliferation of strong encryption.” Too late, guys. Cat’s out of the bag. Failing that, NSA will attempt to break the encryption, by whatever means it has available to it.

As a side note, I will say that even after thousands of years, there is still only one completely unbreakable (by analysis) encryption method, and that is the one-time pad. However, it carries its own problems, such as how to generate the pad, and deliver the pad to your correspondent, and keep it secure from your adversaries. Security is a trade-off, and in evaluating the right encryption method to use in a secure communication, you must carefully consider the threat model, that is, how your communications might be attacked.

I’ve done you a big favor and left out most of the document, (PDF) which, even in the relevant parts, is full of dot-com era buzzwords. Come on, “eSIGINT”? I hope they’re not still doing that.